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The rules governing the selection of which sensory
information reaches consciousness are yet unknown. Of
our senses, vision is often considered to be the dominant
sense, and the effects of bodily senses, such as
proprioception, on visual consciousness are frequently
overlooked. Here, we demonstrate that the position of
the body influences visual consciousness. We induced
perceptual suppression by using continuous flash
suppression. Participants had to judge the orientation a
target stimulus embedded in a task-irrelevant picture of a
hand. The picture of the hand could either be congruent
or incongruent with the participants’ actual hand position.
When the viewed and the real hand positions were
congruent, perceptual suppression was broken more
rapidly than during incongruent trials. Our findings
provide the first evidence of a proprioceptive bias in
visual consciousness, suggesting that proprioception not
only influences the perception of one’s own body and self-
consciousness, but also visual consciousness.
Introduction
The sources and modulators of conscious experience
have long been a matter of debate in psychology,
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philosophy, and neuroscience (de Gardelle & Kouider,
2009; Pacherie, Green, & Bayne, 2006). Traditionally,
the scientiﬁc study of consciousness has been divided
along two lines. Thus, conscious perception has been
studied extensively, mostly in the visual domain
(Dehaene & Changeux, 2011; Dehaene & Naccache,
2001), whereas a different line of research investigated
bodily self-consciousness and multimodal integration
of bodily signals (Jeannerod, 2003). Both ﬁelds have
typically been studied separately, thereby neglecting
possible modulatory effects between bodily informa-
tion and visual awareness.
Bodily self-consciousness refers to the integrated,
prereﬂexive experience of being a self in a body and has
been related to multimodal bodily information from
tactile (Salomon, van Elk, Aspell, & Blanke, 2012),
vestibular (Blanke, 2012), and proprioceptive (Costan-
tini & Haggard, 2007) as well as visual and action
information (Salomon, Malach, & Lamy, 2009; Tsa-
kiris, Haggard, Franck, Mainy, & Sirigu, 2005).
Clinical data from epilepsy and stroke patients are
associated with disturbances in multisensory integra-
tion caused by damage to the temporoparietal cortex
(Blanke, Landis, Spinelli, & Seeck, 2004), corroborat-
ing earlier ﬁndings on body schema disturbances in
patients with visuospatial neglect following damage to
similar regions.
Visual awareness has been investigated in a large
variety of behavioral and neuroimaging experiments
(Kim & Blake, 2005; Rees, 2007). In binocular rivalry
paradigms, each eye is presented with a different image,
and perception typically alternates between the two
images (Tong, Nakayama, Vaughan, & Kanwisher,
1998). This allows for a controlled study of visual
awareness as the same images are constantly present on
the retina and only conscious perception alternates.
Recently, a novel paradigm called the breaking
continuous ﬂash suppression (b-CFS) paradigm has
been introduced as a particularly sensitive measure of
invisible stimulus processing (Jiang, Costello, & He,
2007; Tsuchiya & Koch, 2005; Tsuchiya, Koch, Gilroy,
& Blake, 2006). This paradigm uses rapid presentation
of high-contrast images to one eye to suppress visual
target stimuli presented to the other eye, with the time
that it takes targets to overcome interocular suppres-
sion being the dependent variable.
Previous studies have shown that parameters such as
attentional load (Bahrami, Lavie, & Rees, 2007),
inverted faces (Jiang et al., 2007), and natural scene
content (Mudrik, Breska, Lamy, & Deouell, 2011)
modulate suppression times in b-CFS. To what degree
visual awareness may be modulated by nonvisual
signals, in particular proprioceptive signals (which are a
major determinant of bodily self-consciousness; Ehrs-
son, Spence, & Passingham, 2004), has so far not been
investigated. In the present study, we used the b-CFS
paradigm to test if changes in participants’ hand
position affect the duration of suppression when task-
irrelevant images of hands in congruent and incon-
gruent positions are co-presented with standard b-CFS
stimuli. Previous studies using active tactile exploration
(Lunghi, Binda, & Morrone, 2010) and olfaction have
shown that congruent multisensory information causes
shorter suppression times (Zhou, Jiang, He, & Chen,
2010) in interocular competition. We hypothesized that
trials with congruent visual and proprioceptive infor-
mation would have shorter suppression times than
incongruent trials when suppressed by CFS but would
show no difference when not visually suppressed.
Methods
Participants
Participants in the main experiment were 21 right-
handed healthy volunteers (ﬁve women) from the
student population at Ecole Polytechnique Fe´de´rale de
Lausanne (EPFL; age 19–30 years, M ¼ 23.6 years).
The control experiment included 19 right-handed
participants (seven women; age 20–24 years, M ¼ 21.8
years). All participants had normal or corrected-to-
normal sight and no psychiatric or neurological history.
They participated in the study for payment (about 15
CHF). All participants gave informed consent, and the
study was approved by the ethics committee of EPFL.
One participant was removed from the analysis because
of reaction times longer than 2.5 SDs above the mean.
Another participant could not ﬁnish the experiment as
he did not break the perceptual suppression.
Stimuli and procedure
Stimuli consisted of high-contrast dynamic noise
patches suppressors (‘‘Mondrians’’; Hesselmann &
Malach, 2011) and target stimuli. The target pictures
were two pictures of hands (one dorsal up and one
palm up, visual angle H:168 V:188; Ionta & Blanke,
2009) in which we embedded the target region in a
small white square (visual angle H:28 V:28) with
horizontal or vertical lines (Figure 1). Although stimuli
were quite similar in their low-level features, as can be
seen in the spectral power analysis in Supplementary
Figure S1, our 2 · 2 full factorial design ensured that
the low-level features of the images were controlled
with respect to the experimental design. Stimuli were
presented using ExpyVR, a custom-built multimedia
stimuli presentation software developed with Python
2.6 and the Open Graphics Library v.2.2. The stimuli
were viewed via a head-mounted display (HMD;
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VR1280 Immersion Inc., SXGA, 608, diagonal ﬁeld of
view, refresh rate 60 Hz). Mondrians were rapidly (10
Hz) ﬂashed to the participants’ dominant eye (visual
angle H:488 V:368), and the target was presented
simultaneously to the other eye. A red ﬁxation spot
(visual angle H:38 V:38) was presented to both eyes.
Participants were ﬁrst tested for ocular dominance
using the Miles test (Miles, 1930). They were then
instructed to indicate the orientation of the lines inside
the white box (horizontal or vertical) and to respond as
quickly as possible. Participants were ﬁtted with the
HMD, which allowed them to view only the experi-
mental display and not their hands or surroundings.
The experimenter then placed their left hand on the
response joystick, which was placed in front of them.
Participants were required to hold the joystick in their
left hand in a manner that compelled them to hold their
hand perpendicular to the table, thus making the left
hand position orthogonal to that used in the experi-
mental conditions. The participant’s right hand was
comfortably placed on the table in front of their body
with the palm up or the palm down (see Figure 1B).
The b-CFS experiment included 320 trials divided
into two blocks. The total duration of the experiment
was about 1 hour. Each trial began with the simulta-
neous presentation of the Mondrians and target image
to separate eyes (see Figure 1A). The contrast of the
target image was ramped up from zero to full contrast
over 2 s. The trial ended when participants pressed a
key on a joystick to indicate their response. Target
orientation was randomized, and the participants’ right
hand position was changed between blocks. Initial
hand position and condition order were randomized
between participants.
Following the experiment, participants ﬁlled in a
questionnaire for demographic data and were asked to
indicate the perceived content of the pictures they
viewed, what they believed the objective of the
experiment was, and whether they felt that their right
hand position affected their performance on the task.
Following Jiang et al. (2007), we employed a control
experiment to control for possible differences in
detection time due to response or detection criteria. The
control experiment was identical to the main experi-
ment except that the target images were blended into
the Mondrians (Figure 1B) and presented to both eyes.
Hence, in the control experiment, there was no ﬂash
suppression. Therefore, comparison of the results from
Figure 1. Experimental design. (A) CFS experiment, Mondrian masks were presented to the dominant eye. The target image presented
to other eye was either congruent or incongruent with the participant’s hand position. (B) Control experiment. Similar stimuli were
presented to both eyes; hence, no binocular suppression. (C) A 2 · 2 full factorial design. Gray-scale hands are the task-irrelevant
visual stimuli presented to the nondominant eye. Color hands represent the nonvisible hand position of the participant. Participants
were required to indicate the orientation of lines in the square of the visually presented hand stimuli.
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the control and b-CFS experiments would allow one to
test if the results in the b-CFS experiment are exclusive
to the visual suppression condition or may reﬂect a
more general bias (Mudrik et al., 2011).
Results
Reaction times
Response times (RTs) for erroneous trials and
reaction times more than 2.5 SDs from the mean (less
than 3% of trials) were removed from the analysis. RTs
were submitted to a 2 · 2 repeated-measures ANOVA
with viewed hand orientation (dorsal/palm) and hand
position congruency (congruent/incongruent) as with-
in-subject factors. The results showed (Figure 2) a main
effect for congruency, F(1, 18)¼ 4.52, p¼ 0.04, g2¼ 0.2,
with trials in which the viewed and real hand positions
were congruent breaking suppression more rapidly (M
¼ 3.24 s, SE¼ 0.56 s) than in the incongruent situation
(M¼3.30 s, SE¼0.58 s). A main effect for viewed hand
orientation was also found, F(1, 18)¼5.8251, p¼0.026,
g2 ¼ 0.24, with responses on trials with a dorsal hand
view (M¼ 3.21 s, SE¼ 0.58 s) being more rapid than in
the palm-up condition (M ¼ 3.33 s, SE ¼ 0.56 s). No
interaction between the factors was found (F , 1).
Control experiment RTs were submitted to an
identical 2 · 2 analysis of variance (ANOVA). Unlike
the CFS results, the control experiment results indi-
cated neither any difference between the congruent (M
¼2.08 s, SE¼0.22 s) and incongruent (M¼2.06 s, SE¼
0.21 s) conditions, F(1, 18) , 1, nor for the viewed
hand orientation, F(1, 18) ¼ 2.3, p¼ 0.15, or
interaction, F(1, 18) , 1. A joint analysis of the CFS
and control experiments in a repeated-measures AN-
OVA with experiment as a between-subject factor
revealed a signiﬁcant interaction between experiment
and congruency, F(1, 36)¼ 4.43, p¼ 0.04, g2¼ 0.1, with
a signiﬁcantly larger difference between congruent and
incongruent in the b-CFS experiment than in the
control experiment in addition to main effects (Figure
3).
To further test the robustness of the congruency
effect, we used a permutation test in which the
congruency score (incongruent-congruent) of each
participant was randomly divided into two groups. The
difference in the congruency score between the two
shufﬂed groups was computed. This was repeated
10,000 times to create a null distribution, and the true
difference between the CFS and control scores was
compared with the 95th percentile of the resulting
distribution (Supplementary Figure S2). The true
difference was larger than the 95th percentile (p ¼
0.023).
Finally, to test for possible effects of ocular
dominance or block order, we employed an additional
ANOVA with ocular dominance (left/right) and block
order (dorsal ﬁrst/palm ﬁrst) as between-subject
factors. No effects of these factors on RTs were found
(all p . 0.1).
Accuracy
Overall accuracy in the b-CFS condition was 95.9%.
A 2 · 2 repeated-measures ANOVA with viewed hand
orientation (dorsal/palm) and hand position congru-
ency (congruent/incongruent) as within-subject factors
revealed no differences between conditions (all p. 0.1).
In the control experiment, the overall accuracy was
97.2%. Results of an identical ANOVA showed no
effect of the conditions on accuracy (all p . 0.25).
Questionnaire data
Of the 19 participants in the experiment, ﬁve (26%)
were not aware of the presentation of both dorsal and
palmar pictures of the hand. All participants remained
naı¨ve to the true aim of the experiment. Only one
participant noticed the manipulation of hand position
between blocks as relevant to the experiment. Finally,
all participants claimed that their hand position had no
effect on their task performance.
Discussion
Our results provide clear evidence that the congru-
ency of our participants’ limb position with the task-
irrelevant co-presented hand affected visual conscious-
ness in the absence of visual awareness. This is, to the
best of our knowledge, the ﬁrst demonstration of the
Figure 2. Mean detection time by congruency. Note significantly
reduced suppression time when hand posture and task-
irrelevant visual hand are congruent. Error bars are SEM.
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effects of proprioception on visual consciousness.
Results from the control experiment allow us to rule
out alternative explanations of these results such as
partial awareness, detection, or response biases. Fur-
thermore, the results show that the dorsal view of the
hand gains access to consciousness more rapidly than
the palm view regardless of the congruency with the
participants’ limb position. Importantly, our results
were found for both hand orientations in a full factorial
design, ensuring that they did not arise from the visual
characteristics of the presented images but rather from
the integration of visual-proprioceptive information.
Interestingly, several b-CFS studies have found that
upright faces break suppression more rapidly than
inverted faces (Jiang et al., 2007; Stein, Hebart, &
Sterzer, 2011). Although these ﬁndings have been
attributed to the visual familiarity of the upright
images, the congruent proprioceptive information
arising from the participants’ posture during the
experiment may have contributed to this effect as well.
This interpretation is strengthened by the ﬁnding that
visually inverted objects did not show longer suppres-
sion times than the same objects in their familiar
upright positions (Stein, Sterzer, & Peelen, 2012).
The ﬁnding that visual stimuli that are congruent
with the current body position gain more rapid access
to visual consciousness extends the ﬁndings from
previous studies of cross-modal effects on visual
consciousness in other nonvisual modalities (Van Ee,
van Boxtel, Parker, & Alais, 2009). For example, using
a b-CFS paradigm, Zhou and colleagues (2010) found
that olfactory stimuli that matched the visual image
(e.g., a rose) had shorter suppression times than
incongruent smells. Another study, using active explo-
ration of tactile stimuli that were spatially congruent to
one percept in a binocular rivalry paradigm, caused
longer dominance times for the congruent visual stimuli
(Lunghi et al., 2010). However, an important difference
between these studies and the current one is that in the
current design, the hand position and the visual hand
were task irrelevant, whereas in the tactile study, the
active exploration of the tactile grating clearly made
them explicitly relevant to the visually presented
corresponding gratings. In addition, visual stimuli that
were consistent with participants’ voluntary move-
ments were found to have longer dominance times and
shorter suppression times than stimuli moving in an
inconsistent manner (Maruya, Yang, & Blake, 2007).
These ﬁndings suggest that cross-modal information
biases visual consciousness toward the congruent
resolution of the interocular visual conﬂict. More
recently, it has been shown that for purely visual
information, the inclusion of an incongruent object in a
natural scene (e.g., a basketball player holding a
watermelon) had shorter suppression times than
identical ones with congruent objects (Mudrik et al.,
2011). This may indicate a difference in unconscious
integration of cross-modal information, for which
congruent multisensory information shows shorter
suppression times (Zhou et al., 2010). Conversely, in
unimodal visual perceptual conﬂicts, incongruent
information result in shorter suppression times
(Mudrik et al., 2011).
The current results showed that dorsal hand images
that are more familiar visually break suppression more
rapidly than palm-up images. This ﬁnding extends
previous ﬁndings from mental imagery showing more
rapid processing of dorsal hand image rotation with
respect to palm image rotations (Ionta & Blanke, 2009).
Interestingly, a recent study using a novel version of the
hand laterality task has suggested that proprioceptive
information is used to match the representation of the
viewed hand to one’s own hand in order to decide
about the laterality of the hand when this is ambiguous
(Viswanathan, Fritz, & Grafton, 2012). The rapid
breaking of suppression by the dorsal view suggests
that during unconscious processing, visual conscious-
ness is biased toward more familiar images. This is in
line with ﬁndings from previous studies using b-CFS
showing more rapid breaking of suppression for
familiar words as well as upright faces (Jiang et al.,
2007; Stein et al., 2011).
The mechanism by which proprioceptive informa-
tion may bias visual consciousness is likely related to
integration of bodily signals with visual information to
create a coherent sense of bodily self-consciousness
(Blanke, 2012). However, a previous study using
binocular rivalry has shown that visual imagery can
affect subsequent visual consciousness (Pearson, Clif-
ford, & Tong, 2008), indicating the involvement of
high-level cognitive processes such as mental imagery in
binocular rivalry. However, several lines of evidence
suggest that mental imagery of hand position was not
Figure 3. Congruency effect in the CFS and non-CFS experi-
ments. The congruency effect (incongruent-congruent) in the
CFS experiment was positive and significant. No such effect was
found in the non-CFS control experiment. Error bars are SEM.
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responsible for the results presented here. First,
participants donned the HMD prior to the positioning
of the hand on the table; hence, they had no perceptual
image of their hand position on the table. In the article
by Pearson and colleagues (2008), having a clear and
speciﬁc percept (the image shown on a previous trial)
was shown to be an important factor affecting rivalry.
The authors suggest that the effect is a form of
perceptual priming, whereby imagery of a previously
displayed stimulus facilitates the perception of a similar
stimuli (Pearson et al., 2008). Furthermore, Pearson
and colleagues show evidence that viewing a competing
stimulus during the imagery epochs caused the imagery
to be ineffective in inﬂuencing rivalry. Because in our
experiments, participants were not requested to attend
to proprioceptive stimuli and were constantly bom-
barded with highly salient visual stimuli, it is highly
unlikely that mental imagery had a signiﬁcant inﬂuence
on the results.
The neural mechanisms underlying visual con-
sciousness have been the focus of many studies (Haynes
& Rees, 2005; Rees, 2007). Speciﬁcally, binocular
rivalry paradigms have shown that activity in the
primary (Haynes & Rees, 2005) and extrastriate (Tong,
2003) visual cortex correlate with the dominant percept.
Thus, it is widely accepted that the formation of visual
consciousness in a rivalry situation involves interplay
between low-level visual regions and higher-order areas
located in the extrastriate regions (Sterzer, Kleinsch-
midt, & Rees, 2009). However, the current results show
that proprioceptive signals known to be encoded in
sensorimotor regions, such as postcentral gyrus areas
3a and 2 (Seiss et al., 2002) as well as area 5 (Graziano,
Cooke, & Taylor, 2000) inﬂuence visual consciousness.
A possible region that may play a role in the integration
of such bodily and visual information is the extrastriate
body area (EBA). The EBA was originally considered
to be a visual region with a selective preference for
body parts (Downing, Jiang, Shuman, & Kanwisher,
2001). However, later studies have shown that the EBA
is also activated by unseen motor actions (Astaﬁev,
Stanley, Shulman, & Corbetta, 2004) as well as
incongruence between visual and executed movements
(David et al., 2007). The EBA is also part of the
network related to bodily self-consciousness (Ionta et
al., 2011). Because the EBA is activated by viewed body
parts, responds to motor actions, and is involved in
bodily self-consciousness, it is a possible candidate for
modifying visual consciousness based on propriocep-
tive signals. Further studies are needed to identify the
neural underpinnings of this effect.
Finally, our ﬁndings are pertinent to a fundamental
question relating to the neural correlates of conscious-
ness. Several studies suggest that perceptual con-
sciousness arises from focal activity in specialized brain
regions (Fisch et al., 2009; Moutoussis & Zeki, 2002),
whereas others propose that consciousness is related to
widespread activity across multiple brain regions
(Dehaene & Naccache, 2001). The current results
suggest that perceptual consciousness results from
integration of information from several cortical pro-
cessing sites, as we show that proprioceptive informa-
tion coded in sensorimotor regions affects visual
consciousness.
To summarize, our results show that the congruence
of real and viewed hand position inﬂuences the
formation of visual consciousness even when it is task
irrelevant. This is the ﬁrst demonstration that propri-
oceptive information affects visual consciousness and
suggests that body signals may actively inﬂuence
consciousness.
Keywords: consciousness, proprioception, bodily con-
sciousness, continuous ﬂash suppression
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